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THESIS SUMMARY 
 Many multinational companies that expand their operations into Latin America do 
so with a ‘Latin American strategy’. This follows the misconception that Latin American 
countries are so economically, politically, and culturally similar that one singular strategy 
will work in all countries. This thesis addresses the incorrect assumption that a Latin 
American strategy is effective and that Latin American countries are similar enough to be 
interchangeable in a business sense.  
 This report looks at three Latin American countries – Colombia, Chile, and Peru – 
that are similar in terms of trade activity and that have well-developed business 
environments, in order to evaluate the differences in economic policy, legal environment, 
and culture between the three countries. Data from the Business Monitor International 
database and indices is used to evaluate these countries, mainly their Country Risk Index 
and Operational Risk Index. The Operational Risk Index is further divided into the Trade 
& Investment Risk Index and Legal Risk Index. This report also utilizes Hofstede’s 
Cultural Dimensions to evaluate the business culture in each country in terms of power 
distance and individualism v. collectivism. These factors are the rulers by which the risk 
environments of the Colombia, Chile, and Peru were evaluated. 
Colombia scores the lowest in overall Country Risk, meaning that it has the most 
risky environment overall. Taking into account the cultural, economic, and legal 
landscapes for Colombia, legal risk is the most important consideration for companies 
that wish to successfully engage in the Colombian market. Corruption and the weakened 
rule of law make it difficult, if not impossible, for companies to enforce contracts or 
protect their property rights. Therefore, it is advised for companies to partner with 
Colombian businesses in order to form strong relationships and to benefit from their 
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knowledge of Colombian law. Colombia also does not protect intellectual property rights, 
and so would represent a risky environment for companies dependent on research and 
development, such as pharmaceuticals. However, Colombia’s free trade agreements and 
elimination of tariffs on consumer and industrial goods encourages U.S. companies to 
export to Colombia, a strategy that avoids the operational risk of operating a business in 
Colombia.  
Chile presents the least risky environment overall, outperforming Colombia and 
Peru in every category, and ranks second out of 42 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries in terms of trade and investment risk. Its market liberalization policies in the 
70s and 80s created a free market and encouraged trade with many countries including 
the United States. The Chilean government strongly encourages FDI and currently has 
the third highest FDI stock in the region at $215.5bn (BMI Research, Chile Trade). For 
firms looking to start a business in Latin America, Chile is the most receptive country for 
FDI. The strong legal system, protection of property rights, lack of corruption, and open 
economic policies make Chile a welcoming environment for foreign investment and 
exports of consumer and industrial goods. 
The prevalence of corruption in Peru’s legal system is a large concern for 
companies, especially small and medium sized enterprises, attempting to operate in Latin 
America. Contracts are rarely enforced and legal battles can be lengthy and expensive, 
for example, cases on intellectual property rights. Peru has been on the U.S. Trade 
Representative’s Special 301 watch list for Intellectual Property Rights since 1992, 
posing a threat to companies in R&D intensive industries. Small firms may not have the 
resources to fight a legal battle over IPR, and without legal protection, these companies 
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lose their competitive advantage in the market. Besides the political and legal deterrents, 
Peru is also struggling with social unrest in more rural areas. Rural townspeople and 
indigenous peoples are protesting the operation of large multinational mining companies 
in the country. This kind of conflict can largely affect opportunities for incorporation in 
those areas and sectors. However, companies focused solely on trade with Peru instead of 
foreign direct investment, such as manufacturers of consumer goods or mining and 
construction equipment, have a positive outlook because they avoid many of the risks 
associated with incorporating and operating in Peru. 
This report provides analysis of the business and risk environments of three Latin 
American countries and will benefit the South Carolina Small Business Development 
Center, an organization committed providing small and medium sized enterprises tools 
and assistance towards entrepreneurial growth and success. Part of their mission is to help 
small firms that are interested in expanding internationally. These firms will use this as a 
resource for preliminary analysis of the Colombian, Chilean, and Peruvian markets, as 
well as a basis for their product-specific market research to then successfully engage in 




From a shared past of colonization, struggle for independence, and the ongoing 
search for identidad nacional, Latin American countries have developed similarities that 
tie them together as a region. A shared language and history are examples of 
characteristics that, from an outside perspective, present Latin America as a more 
homogeneous region than other parts of the world. This misconception often leads 
businesses to develop a strategy for Latin America as a region, rather than for the 
individual countries that they wish to target. For many companies, this results in failed 
marketing and trade strategies that do not account for the cultural and societal differences 
between Latin American countries. Especially susceptible to this kind of misstep are 
smaller firms without the international experience or network to gain firsthand 
knowledge of how to conduct business in these countries.  
The purpose of this report is to analyze three of the most promising Latin 
American countries for U.S. exporting and foreign direct investment – Colombia, Chile, 
and Peru – in terms of trade and investment risk, including economic openness and legal 
environment, and cultural environment to assess the risk landscape of these countries and 
to make a recommendation for small businesses entering the Latin American market. 
Trade and investment risk will be evaluated in part by data from the BMI Research 
Country Risk Index, an evaluation of 130 countries around the world that gauges the 
dangers of foreign investment in a country based on its economic, political, and business 
environments. The BMI Index is presented as a barometer of risk, measuring the 
vulnerability of the business environment in a country (BMI Research, Country Risk 
Index). It is comprised of four indices: a composite index (Country Risk Index), an 
economic index, a political index, and a business environment index (Operational Risk 
7 
Index). This report will focus on the data from the Country Risk Index and the 
Operational Risk Index, which contains the subcategory of Trade and Investment Risk. It 
will not include rankings from the political or economic indices for the following reasons. 
Operational Risk is the most relevant factor to consider when evaluating exporting to and 
investing in a country as it evaluates the business environment and stability. Country Risk 
Index, on the other hand, is a compilation of the scores in all categories to provide a 
general risk ranking, meaning it comprises the political and economic risk rankings. 
Therefore, it is unnecessary, considering the scope of this report, to separately analyze the 
political and economic categories within Country Risk. For all indices, countries are 
scored from 0-100 in each category with 100 representing the lowest possible risk state. 
The BMI Index states that the scores are comprised of 20 sub-index scores and 79 
individual data sets and surveys, all of which factor into the final scores and rankings. 
Trade statistics from the GlobalEdge database will also provide support for the 
analysis of these countries. The data gathered from the GlobalEdge database contains 
import and export statistics between the United States and Latin American countries to 
further analyze the United States’ most active trading partners. 
In addition to these resources, this report will use country data from The Hofstede 
Centre on Hofstede’s six dimensions of culture to analyze the business culture in 
Colombia, Chile, and Peru. Professor Geert Hofstede is the founder of comparative 
intercultural research, and his theory of cultural dimensions has been widely studied by 
business academics and multinational corporations alike. His study evaluates how 
workplace values and behavior are influenced by culture, measured from 0-100 on the six 
dimensions of power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long 
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term orientation, and indulgence (“Geert Hofstede”, 2016). This report will analyze the 
business cultures in Colombia, Chile, and Peru through the lens of power distance and 
individualism.  
Power distance is the perceived level of authority between different levels in a 
hierarchical system. In the case of a business environment, this would be exemplified by 
the relationship between an employee and his immediate boss. In countries with a higher 
power distance, businesses are more likely to have a top down management structure 
with an authoritative relationship between a worker and his boss. In this type of 
environment, feedback given from a worker in a lower rung of the hierarchy would be 
considered out of place and, in some cases, offensive. In low power distance 
environments, businesses have flatter, horizontal management structures that promote 
collaboration and constructive feedback between group members. Managers expect their 
workers to be honest with them when providing opinions and welcome ideas from any 
level of the organization. Another difference in power distance is type of person who can 
become a senior member as promotion in a high power distance environment is very 
closely related to age. In a low power distance workplace, promotions are more merit-
based and age has less effect on who will advance within the organization. 
Individualism v. collectivism is a dimension that evaluates how members of a 
group or society view others in their society, otherwise referred to as the in-group. In an 
individualistic environment, scoring closer to 100, individuals feel the need to take care 
of themselves and acknowledge their own efforts for their successes and failures. In these 
types of societies, a graduate moving back in with his parents might be perceived as a 
failure to succeed through his own efforts. In individualistic work environments, 
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interpersonal competition is more visible as employees put more weight on their 
individual accomplishments. However, collectivist societies, those scoring on the low end 
of the scale, are focused more on the wellbeing of the in-group. Members prioritize 
supporting each other and take comfort in the security net offered by the group loyalty. In 
these types of societies, such as most Latin American countries, it is more common for 
extensive families to live under the same roof and for children to live with their parents 
until their late twenties. Collectivist work environments are generally more collaborative 
and there is a communal sense of ownership over projects, eliminating the occurrence of 
the free rider effect. Nepotism is not seen as corruption in these societies, but is viewed as 
taking care of the members of the in-group. 
This report will compare these countries’ scores on the power distance and 
individualism dimensions to the United States’ scores in order to evaluate differences in 
values and behavior between the countries. By recognizing these differences, U.S. 
businesses expanding to Latin America can adjust their orientation to better work with 
local companies. 
SCOPE 
For the purposes of this analysis, Latin America is defined as the countries in the 
Americas where mainly Spanish and Portuguese are spoken. The region includes Mexico 
as well as the majority of countries in Central and South America, but excludes French 
Guyana, Guyana, and Suriname. 
Mexico and Brazil were excluded when determining the countries of focus for this 
report because they represent outliers in many of the region’s statistics – including GDP, 
exports, size, and population – so they could not realistically be compared with smaller 
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Latin American countries. Figure 1 below uses 2014 World Bank Data to show Latin 
American countries ranked in descending order by Nominal GDP.  
 
Figure 1: Latin American Countries ranked by Nominal GDP. 2014 World Bank Data 
Mexico has the fifteenth largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP over 
twice as large as the next ranked Latin American country. Because of its membership of 
NAFTA since 1994 and geographic proximity to the United States, Mexico has already 
been established as the natural market for exporting by U.S. based companies. Therefore, 
Mexico has been excluded to instead provide insight on Latin American countries whose 
policies and operational risks small U.S. business may not be as familiar with.  
 Brazil has also been excluded from this report for various reasons, despite its 
status as a BRIC country and its trend of incredible economic and market growth. Firstly, 
as the seventh largest economy in the world, with a nominal GDP in 2015 of $2.346 
trillion (The World Bank), Brazil is also considered an outlier in Latin America in terms 
of economic activity. In order to analyze countries of similar economic size as 
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disqualified Brazil from consideration in this report is the bureaucratic process and red 
tape that still permeates Brazilian business operations. In the World Bank’s 2016 Doing 
Business Report which measures regulatory quality and efficiency of countries around 
the world, Brazil ranked 116th out of 189 total countries. The difficulty of conducting 
business in Brazil is a strong deterrent for small businesses without the capital and in-
country resources to overcome those barriers. The final reason for its exclusion is the 
difference in official language between Brazil and the rest of Latin America.  
The goal of this report is to dispel the misconception that all Spanish-speaking 
countries are culturally and economically similar. It will examine the current and 
projected business environments in Colombia, Chile, and Peru in order to provide a 




 Colombia is a country of roughly 50 million people, located at the junction of 
Central and South America. It is the only South American country that can claim both an 
Atlantic and Pacific Coast, bordering Ecuador in the West, Venezuela in the East, and 
Peru and Brazil to the South. Colombia represents the fourth largest economy in Latin 
America after Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina with a reported GDP of $223 billion in 2014 
(The World Bank). Its economy is heavily dependent on petroleum and coffee exports, 
and has been negatively impacted by falling global commodity prices in the past few 
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years. Macroeconomic analysts worry that a sharper decline in oil prices in 2016 will 
significantly stunt Colombia’s economic growth (BMI Research, Colombia Country).  
 In the BMI Country Risk Index, Colombia ranks 76th out of 130 countries ranked 
with a total score of 58.7 out of 100. This places Colombia 7th in Latin America, 
outperforming most of its immediate neighbors in terms of overall risk. The main reason 
for this above average ranking is its relative political stability in comparison with several 
other South American countries (BMI Research, Colombia Country). It maintains strong 
democratic institutions that ensure peaceful elections and the protection of civil rights 
(“The World Factbook: Colombia”). However, it also boasts some of the region’s worst 
income inequality with one third of the population living below the poverty line 
according to the CIA World Factbook. In addition, Colombia is the largest source of 
refugees in Latin America and has one of the world’s highest levels of forced 
disappearances (“The World Factbook: Colombia”). Illegal drug trade is also a large legal 
and social issue present in Colombia. However, due to its institutional stability and in 
spite of its social conflicts, Colombia has become a strong presence in regional trade and 
has also built a mutually beneficial trading relationship with the United States. 
 Colombia is ranked fifth in South America in terms of total imports (The World 
Bank). The World Bank reported that in 2014 Colombia’s total imports of goods and 
services equaled $75.199 billion (current US$), growing from $62.942 billion 3 years 
prior. The United States accounts for 28.51% of that value as their top trade partner in 
imports, with China ranked second accounting for 18.41% of total imports (UN 
Comtrade). In the years from 2007-2013, the U.S. has comprised over 20% of 
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Colombia’s total imports on average, and Colombia has considered the U.S. a stable 
supply market for manufactured consumer goods (BMI Research, Colombia Trade).  
OPERATIONAL RISK 
 The BMI Country Risk Index is comprised of five sub-indices: short- and long-
term political risk, short- and long-term economic risk, and operational risk. This paper is 
focused on the analysis of Colombia, Chile, and Peru from the perspective of operational 
risk. The following sections will refer to Trade and Investment Risk, a component of 
operational risk. A country’s scores in this and other categories are averaged to determine 
their overall Operational Risk score.   
TRADE AND INVESTMENT RISK 
 Figure 2 below displays the BMI Trade and Investment Risk Index scores for 
Colombia, Chile, and Peru from the 2015 report data. 
 
Figure 2: BMI Trade and Investment Risk Index and Sub-Indices for Colombia, Chile, and Peru 
 Colombia ranks 16th out of 42 Latin American and Caribbean states in overall 
Trade and Investment Risk, but remains below only Chile in South America, representing 
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low risk in the region. Over the past few years, Colombia has reported increased foreign 
direct investment, FDI, demonstrating a positive perception of the investment risk 
environment. The increase is mainly due to recent economic reforms to draw in business 
and increase bureaucratic efficiency. This risk index can be further broken down into 
Legal Risk and Economic Openness scores. Figure 3 below compares the Legal Risk, 
Economic Openness, Government Intervention, and combined Trade and Investment 
Risk scores for Colombia, Chile, and Peru.  
 
Figure 3: Comparison chart of Trade and Investment Risk Index scores for Chile, Colombia, and Peru. 
LEGAL RISK 
In terms of legal risk, Colombia ranks similarly to Peru and far below Chile at 
53.6 out of 100. Colombia’s weak legal system presents some risk to foreign investors. 
The domestic conflict between left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitary groups 
throughout the 20th century weakened the rule of law in Colombia and promoted the 



































For decades, beginning in the 1960s, Colombia suffered through a violent conflict 
between left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitary groups. The largest and oldest left-
wing group in this conflict is known as FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia). They are one of the world’s richest guerrilla armies, founded in 1964 to 
overthrow the government and institute a Marxist regime (“Profiles: Colombia’s Armed 
Groups”). During the 1990s, the right-wing paramilitary forces began an offensive 
against FARC and the group turned its attention to the illegal drug trade in Colombia as a 
way to raise money for their cause. Their increased involvement in the drug trade created 
violent tension in the area. Government intervention remained ineffective until 2006, 
when President Alvaro Uribe launched a strategic offensive against FARC with 
assistance from the U.S. military. In 2012, after six years of conflict with the Colombian 
government forces, FARC began peace talks focusing on six main points: land reform, 
political participation, disarmament of rebels, drug trafficking, victim’s rights, and 
implementation of a peace deal (“Profiles: Colombia’s Armed Groups”).  
Today, FARC is still on the U.S. and European terrorist organization lists, 
maintaining loose control of rural areas in the South and East of Colombia. However, 
peace talks are expected to conclude this year, marking a milestone in political stability 
and security in the region if they are successful. Ongoing negotiations have improved the 
security outlook for foreign investors, increasing confidence in Colombia as a trading 
partner and a potential target for FDI (BMI Research, Colombia Country). According to 
the BMI Country Risk Index SWOT Analysis, support from the IMF and major credit 
rating agencies has also boosted confidence in the stability of Colombia’s economy, 
making it a more attractive market for investment. All three major ratings agencies have 
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upgraded Colombia’s government debt to investment grade (“The World Factbook: 
Colombia”). Although peace talks are expected to conclude successfully, indicating 
increased faith in the government, Colombia still ranks 83rd in the world in the 2015 
Corruption Perceptions Index (“Transparency International”).  
Lack of faith in the government and legal system makes firms hesitate when 
considering investing in Colombia. Another concern pertinent to the operation of 
business is the strength of companies’ legal rights in Colombia. The current government 
does little to ensure contract enforceability or protect property rights, two aspects of the 
legal system most used by foreign businesses to mitigate risk. However, despite the 
pitfalls of Colombia’s legal system, the lack of bureaucracy positively factors into 
Colombia’s index score. The World Bank released a 2015 report of their Ease of Doing 
Business Index where Colombia ranked 54th in the world. The lack of red tape allows 
businesses to be formed quickly and efficiently, encouraging foreign investment in 
Colombia.  
 Considering all of these factors, however, Colombia underperforms regionally in 
the Legal Risk Category, ranked 24th out of 42 Latin American and Caribbean countries 
with a score of 47.1 out of 100.  
ECONOMIC OPENNESS 
 Colombia ranks lowest of the three countries in terms of Economic Openness with 
a score of 50.6 out of 100. Colombia ranks 5th out of 42 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries behind Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. Colombia boasts one of the 
largest total trade volumes in the region, its import/export total equaling $319.7 billion in 
2015 (BMI Research, Colombia Trade). Its extensive free trade agreements, few barriers 
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to trade, and competitive free trade zone arrangements make Colombia attractive for 
foreign investors. Colombia implemented a free trade agreement with the United States 
(its biggest import and export partner) in 2012, reducing tariffs for a variety of key 
products. At the time of implementation, 80% of U.S. consumer and industrial good 
exports to Colombia were tariff-free, and the rest will be phased out by 2022 ("U.S.-
Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement"). According to the Colombian Embassy in 
Washington, D.C., between June 2012 and February 2013, U.S. exports to Colombia 
increased by 20%, demonstrating major increases in oil, aircraft and parts, and electric 
machinery (“US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement”, 2013). 
Colombia has also negotiated FTAs with Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, and Chile, showing trade openness in South as well as North 
America. Free trade agreements with the Republic of Korea, Costa Rica, and Israel have 
been negotiated but have not yet been implemented. This range of free trade agreements 
demonstrates Colombia’s desire to encourage regional and global trade and reduce the 
cost of importing products. It is regionally integrated as a member of the Pacific Alliance 
Trade Bloc (other members include Mexico, Chile, and Peru) and is a member of the 
World Trade Organization. Due to its broad range of free trade agreements and regional 
organizational memberships, Colombia has an average tariff rate of 2.0%, a rate below 
Chile, but above Peru’s rate of 0.7% (BMI Research, Colombia Trade). Colombia is 
expected to continue its pursuit of FTAs in the future, further lowering its average tariff 
rate. 
Currently, Colombia presents a trade deficit with imports outweighing exports at 
$72.9 billion and $66.9 billion, respectively, boding well for companies looking to export 
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to Colombia. However, the trade deficit is expected to increase with the reduction of oil 
exports due to the global drop in oil prices. This continued decrease in global oil prices, 
Colombia’s key export, will slow economic growth, affecting consumer confidence and 
reducing demand for imported consumer products (BMI Research, Colombia Trade). 
Colombia’s imports experienced stable growth in the years since the global financial 
crisis, however only saw growth of 0.8% in 2015 due to pressure on consumer spending 
(BMI Research, Colombia Trade). While low tariff rates and free trade agreements make 
a welcome trade environment, the fall of global oil prices could decrease Colombia’s 
importing power in the long run. 
CULTURE 
 
Figure 4: Power Distance Index and Individualism v Collectivism Index scores for Colombia and the United States. 
 On the Power Distance Index (PDI), Colombia scores high with 67 out of 100, 
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Colombian work environment, vertical management structures are much more common 
than horizontal structures. Because managers have a higher rank than the employees, the 
relationship is more authoritative. Employees are expected to respect the ideas of 
managers (usually their elders) and to withhold criticism or feedback. On the other hand, 
the United States scored below average with a score of 40 out of 100 on the Power 
Distance Index. The United States work environment is more moderate with a mix of 
these two attitudes, but there is a strong weight towards low power distance coming from 
the long-held American belief in equality. In this type of environment, horizontal 
management structures are preferred and managers welcome feedback from their 
employees.  
 On the scale of Individualism v. Collectivism, Colombia scores extremely low in 
the index at 13, meaning it is one of the most collectivist cultures in the world. In Latin 
America, it is only surpassed by Ecuador, Panama, and Guatemala (“Geert Hofstede”, 
2016). In this type of society, nepotism is more common and family names carry more 
weight when conducting business and negotiating contracts because it identifies someone 
as part of the in-group. Paired with the high PDI score, a high collectivist score means 
that Colombians have strong group identities tied to socio-economic classes (“Geert 
Hofstede”, 2016). Conversely, the United States scored 91 out of 100 on the 
individualism v. collectivism scale, meaning that it is an extremely individualistic 
society. Workers are more geographically mobile, focusing on personal achievements and 
career over family and group connections. Americans are also generally more willing to 
judge business partners on their merit and individual accomplishments rather than by 
their association with a certain group. 
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 When conducting business in Colombia, American businesses need to be aware of 
the difference in power distance between the two countries. For example, in a business 
meeting with Colombian executives, Americans must evaluate their status within the 
company and how their Colombian counterparts view them, whether as an equal or as an 
inferior. By reorienting their perspective to an environment with a higher power distance, 
businessmen can phrase their comments and feedback in a way that avoids 
misunderstandings or offense. Individualism v. collectivism also plays a large role in 
business interactions in Colombia as Colombians focus more on building relationships 
through their business visits than on completing specific tasks and negotiating (“Geert 
Hofstede”, 2016). For American businessmen, this can seem like an inefficient use of 
time, but for Colombians, establishing relationships is an important step in determining if 
business partners will become a member of their group. 
CHILE 
BACKGROUND 
 Chile is a country that covers most of the western coast of South America, with a 
population of 17 million, 5 million of which reside in the capital city of Santiago. It is the 
longest country measured north to south in the world covering 38˚ of latitude. Its strategic 
location provides access to shipping lanes between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, 
specifically the Strait of Magellan, the Beagle Channel, and the Drake Passage. The 
6,435 km of coastline is host to over 30 sea ports and container terminals (“The World 
Factbook: Chile”). Chile’s economy is heavily dependent on copper exports, which 
account for over 40% of the country’s total exports (Jamasmie, 2012). It is by far the 
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world’s largest copper producer and exporter with possession of 28% of the estimated 
global reserves according to the U.S. Geological Survey commodity report. Commodity 
exports, including copper, make up 75% of Chile’s total exports, making the economy 
extremely reactive to global commodity prices.  
 Figure 5 below shows the top ranked Latin American countries by Country Risk 
Index.  
 
Figure 5: Comparison of Latin American countries by Overall Country Risk Index 
In the BMI Country Risk Index, Chile ranks 1st out of 42 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries with a high score of 71.5 out of 100, and ranks 29th globally. For 
comparison, the Eurozone placed 33rd with a score of 69.8 and the United States placed 
12th scoring 78.2. Chile far outperforms regionally with the next highest ranked Latin 
American country, Panama, ranking 46th globally. Chile stands out regionally for its 
promotion of foreign trade as one of the countries with the most bilateral free trade 
agreements in the world. Although the highly regulated trade environment and small 








































































































 According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicator Data, Chile had 
total imports in 2014 of $82.631. China is their number one source of imports, making up 
20.88% of their total imports, while the United States is a close second at 19.77% of total 
imports (UN Comtrade). The United States and Chile entered into a free trade agreement 
in 2004 that classified 80% of U.S. consumer and industrial goods exported to Chile as 
duty free. The remaining tariffs were phased out gradually until, as of January 2015, 
100% of those products were duty free. In the 11 years since the FTA went into effect, 
U.S. exports to Chile have increased 513%, from only $2.7 billion in 2003 to $16.6 
billion in 2014 ("The U.S.—Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA)"). The  success of the 
free trade agreement shows the incredible market potential that Chile demonstrates as a 
destination for U.S. exports, and the effectiveness of Chile’s free trade policies. Chile 
also has a well-developed manufacturing environment and a strong agricultural sector, 
reducing demand for manufactured consumer products and food products. However, 
there is a large market for machinery, vehicle parts, and mechanical appliance imports to 
support the national mining industry. 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
 Figure 2, referenced on page 13, shows the Trade and Investment Risk Index 
scores for Colombia, Chile, and Peru from the 2015 report data. Chile is tied with the 
U.S. Virgin Islands for second place out of 42 Latin American and Caribbean states, 
ranked behind only Puerto Rico. It is considered an extremely stable and safe country in 
terms of trade and investment. Chile scored 66.3 out of 100, outperforming the region 
average of 49.7 by more than 16 points. Chile’s open market policies and the strength of 
its financial institutions are factors that contribute greatly to its high performance. 
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ECONOMIC OPENNESS 
 Chile’s open market and push for free trade agreements can be traced back to its 
economic policies in the 1970s and 80s. From 1974-1984, the Pinochet government 
undertook a radical reform of the Chilean economy and its policies. When Pinochet came 
into power in 1973, Chile’s annual inflation rate was 286 percent. In the coming months, 
that rate grew to 508 percent. Goods like milk and eggs became extremely scarce and 
prices for goods across the board soared as the average tariff for imports reached 105 
percent and imports slowed (Büchi, 2006). With a growing deficit, hyperinflation, and 
growing import tariffs, Chile was in crisis.  
Pinochet turned to the Chicago Boys, a group of economists who studied 
economy theory at the University of Chicago under the mentorship of Milton Friedman 
and Arnold Harberger. These economists became advisors for the Pinochet government 
and proposed many of the reforms that made Chile one of the most prosperous countries 
in South America today. These reforms were ahead of their time, especially in South 
America, and embraced the oncoming globalization of trade. They involved market 
liberalization, privatization of inefficient state companies, and tight fiscal and monetary 
policies (Büchi, 2006). The most important of these reforms was the decision to open 
trade to the rest of the world by lowering tariffs to record levels in order to encourage 
trade and pursuing as many bilateral free trade agreements as possible (Büchi, 2006). 
These policies opened the door to trade and economic growth the likes of which South 
America had not seen in decades, putting Chile years ahead of other countries in the 
region. 
However, the worldwide economic crisis of 1982 threatened to destroy all 
progress made through the Chicago Boys’ reforms. Chile was hit hard during the 
24 
recession, and in 1982 its GDP dropped 14.1 percent (Büchi, 2006). The combination of a 
quickly falling GDP and the overvaluation of their currency at the time made Chile more 
vulnerable to the economic crisis and stopped the flow of foreign investment into the 
country. Tariffs that had been lowered in 1979 soared to 35 percent during the crisis. 
Unemployment reached 20 percent with an additional 10 percent enrolled in government 
sponsored emergency employment programs (Büchi, 2006). The newly elected 
government employed a team of accomplished economic theorists to evaluate the 
economic crisis and implement reforms that would put Chile back on the path of growth 
and competitive trade. Hernán Büchi Buc was one of those economists, and he served as 
Chile’s Minister of Finance from 1985 to 1989. In his article on the successful 
transformation of the Chilean economy at this time, he cites what he thinks were the most 
important reforms implemented. Trade openness, including the proposal of a flat tariff 
rate system, is the first, allowing Chile to compete in a global market despite their small 
population and geographic distance from hubs of global consumption (Büchi, 2006). 
These policies set Chile apart from other Latin American countries by promoting trade 
agreements and low import tariffs across the board and by opening the Chilean market up 
to foreign investment. The second most impactful reform was rebuilding a stronger 
private sector. One of the initiatives to that end was the restructuring of the banking 
sector through corporate, financial sector, and banking regulations. These regulations 
formed the foundation for the stable financial institutions celebrated in Chile today. 
The restructuring of Chile’s economy in the 1970s and the continuity of reform 
throughout the crisis of 1982 put Chile ahead of the pack in terms of international 
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competitiveness. The economic openness and positive foreign investment environment 
that Chile boasts today were made possible through these reforms forty years ago.  
Today Chile is one of the countries with the largest number of bilateral free trade 
agreements in the world. It has 25 trade agreements with 64 markets which together 
represent 64.1% of the world population and 86.3% of worldwide GDP (“Relaciones 
Bilaterales”). It has trade agreements with major trading partners including the U.S., 
China, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the European 
Union. For such a small country, Chile is well connected in global trade through these 
agreements and other organizations. Chile is also a member of the Pacific Alliance, along 
with Colombia and Peru, and signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership in February of this 
year, a controversial agreement that is currently in debate in the U.S. Congress ("The 
World Factbook: Chile"). Signing of the TPP by the U.S. would increase trade between 
the countries through elimination of taxes and barriers to trade, promote job creation, and 
raise standard of living in member countries. 
LEGAL RISKS 
 In the Legal Risk Index, Chile strongly outperforms both Colombia and Peru with 
a score of 69.1 out of 100. One important factor in the legal risk index is the prevalence 
of corruption in each country. In the 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index compiled by 
Transparency International, Chile scores 70 out of 100 and ranks 23rd out of 168 
countries for which data is available. Chile has a transparent legal system with very low 
levels of government corruption, especially for Latin America where the last decades of 
the 20th century were marred with dictatorships, coup d’états, and revolutions 
(“Transparency International”, 2015). A mere 1% of respondents to the World Economic 
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Forums Global Competitiveness Report noted corruption as a problematic factor when 
conducting business in Chile (BMI Research, Chile Trade). It is considered one of the 
least corrupt countries in Latin America.  
The main legal risk associated with investing in Chile comes from the 
bureaucratic process of declaring bankruptcy and closing a business which may inhibit 
certain businesses from incorporating in Chile. However, Chile has the fastest times in 
the region for incorporating and opening a business at 5.5 days. This is far below the 
regional average of 39.5 days (BMI Research, Chile Trade). This efficiency 
counterbalances the inconvenience of resolving insolvency as well as new legislation 
introduced in November 2013 that significantly reduced the time required to complete 
bankruptcy proceedings (BMI Research, Chile Trade). This reform will simplify the 
bankruptcy process moving forward and address the minor concerns about the legal risks 
of Chile’s business environment. 
Chile is a popular target for FDI due to its adherence to international property 
rights law and its protection of property rights (BMI Research, Chile Trade). In the 
World Bank’s 2015 Ease of Doing Business Report, Chile ranked 48th out of 189 
countries ranked. Although there are small inconveniences with conducting business in 
Chile, the transparency of the legal system, strength of property rights, and speed of 
incorporation along with Chile’s promotion of FDI make it a welcoming environment for 




Figure 6: Power Distance Index and Individualism v Collectivism Index scores for Chile and the United States 
On Hofstede’s Power Distance Index (PDI), Chile scores slightly lower than 
Colombia with a score of 63 out of 100. This ranking aligns with many Latin American 
countries where inequality and vertical management structures are more common than 
horizontal, collaborative environments. As in Colombia, workplace relationships between 
managers and employees are more structured and criticism from subordinates is not 
common. The United States scored below average in this category with a score of 40 out 
of 100. As discussed in the comparison of Colombia and the United States, the work 
environment in the U.S. is based heavily on the idea of universal equality. Although the 
United States falls towards the center of the Power Distance Index, it leans towards low 
power distance. 
On the scale of Individualism v. Collectivism, Chile scores higher than both Peru 
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more importance on individualism than the other two countries. A reason for this may be 
the rapid economic development of Chile in the past few decades which tends to favor 
individualism (“Geert Hofstede”, 2016). In the Chilean work environment, family names 
and associations are not as important as in Colombia, and employees are judged by their 
skills. However, outside of Santiago, in the northern and southern regions of the country, 
there is a stronger feeling of community due to the relative isolation of these cities. For 
example, it is imperative for companies interested in the Chilean mining sector, located 
primarily in the northern cities like Antofagasta, to recognize the importance of building 
relationships with Chilean business partners. Chileans in this region have a stronger sense 
of community ties, and so are wary of outsiders, especially in a business environment. 
Americans who are accustomed to a strongly individualistic society must make the effort 
to build strong relationships with Chilean counterparts before attempting to negotiate, or 
colleagues may view their negotiations as brow-beatings. Face to face meetings, 
especially for introductions, are essential to gain entry into the Chilean market ("Business 
Customs"). These meetings form the basis of any future relationship and may last through 
a business lunch or into the afternoon.  
Rushing business meetings, jumping to negotiations, or behaving too informally 
can appear discourteous and may be detrimental to future business success. It is important 
for small business owners to remember that building relationships through personal 
interaction is the foundation for success in the Chilean business environment. These 
meetings both respect the elevated power distance in Chile and pave the way for 




 Peru has a population of 30 million people, almost 30 percent of which live in the 
capital city of Lima. It is located on the western coast of South America, bordering 
Ecuador and Colombia in the north, Brazil and Bolivia to the east, and Chile to the south. 
Peru represents the 7th largest economy in Latin America, just below Chile, with a 
nominal GDP of $128 billion in 2014 (The World Bank). With huge wealth in natural 
resources, its economy is heavily dependent on exports of metals and minerals, mainly 
silver and copper, which account for almost 60% of the country’s total exports (“The 
World Factbook: Peru”). It is the second largest producer of silver and the third largest 
producer of copper in the world, making the economy fairly reactive to fluctuations in 
global commodity prices. From 2009-2013, the economy grew by an average of 5.6% 
partly due to the high prices for metals and minerals during those years (“The World 
Factbook: Peru”).  
 In the BMI Country Risk Index, Peru ranks 68th out of 130 countries given a score 
of 60.8 out of 100. This score places Peru 6th in Latin America just above Colombia and 
below Mexico (BMI Research, Country Risk Index). The main strengths that help Peru’s 
scores are its commitment to promoting free trade and current efforts to improve the 
bureaucratic process. However, an underdeveloped infrastructure, conflict between the 
government and indigenous populations, and a worsening corruption index negatively 
impact Peru’s overall score (BMI Research, Peru Country). Peru also struggles with 
drug-related crime, specifically organized narcotics operations. Many of these operations 
have gained access to Peru through its shared border with Colombia. It is the 2nd largest 
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producer of the coca leaf (instrumental in the production of cocaine) and was the leading 
producer until 1996 (“The World Factbook: Peru”). A significant portion of the harvested 
coca leaves enter the drug market and are used to produce cocaine, making Peru the 2nd 
largest producer of cocaine in the world. This drug is shipped from Peru’s Pacific 
seaports to international markets, mainly the U.S., but the proliferation of narcotic drugs 
has unintentionally increased domestic narcotic consumption as well.  
 The World Bank reported that in 2014 Peru’s total imports of goods and services 
was $48.464 billion (current US$), growing only 11% since 2011 and decreasing by 2.8% 
from 2013-2014. Contracting import statistics indicate a lack of consumer buying power 
and will impact the country’s appeal for foreign investors. This largely affects the United 
States as American products constitute 20.86% of Peru’s total imports. China is barely 
ahead with 21.15% of total imports (UN Comtrade). 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
 Referring back to Figure 2 on page 13, in terms of overall Trade and Investment 
Risk, Peru ranks similarly to Colombia with a score of 53.2 out of 100 and far below 
Chile’s score of 67.6 out of 100 (BMI Research, Country Risk Index). It ranks 22th out of 
42 Latin American and Caribbean States, six places below Colombia, and in the bottom 
50% of countries in the region, presenting more investment risk than either Colombia or 
Chile. Peru has an open policy towards FDI and has few restrictions on trade, both of 
which positively affect its score. However, corruption and a weak legal system jeopardize 
contract enforcement and adequate protection of property rights for foreign companies.  
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ECONOMIC OPENNESS 
 In the Economic Openness Index, Peru ranks 15th out of 42 Latin American and 
Caribbean States with a score of 49.8 out of 100 (BMI Research, Country Risk Index). 
Overall, Peru is an attractive market for foreign direct investment in South America. The 
Peruvian government encourages FDI in areas of special interest such as infrastructure, 
mining, and tourism (BMI Research, Peru Trade). However, recent years have seen slow 
growth in imports and exports due to low global commodity prices and low export 
demand, which is turn negatively affected foreign investment. Fortunately, Peru’s history 
of free market reforms has resulted in strong trade connections and an environment that 
encourages foreign trade. 
 In the 1990s, after drafting a new constitution in 1993, Peru followed Chile’s lead 
from the previous decade and established free market reforms to increase its 
competitiveness in international trade. Peru began pursuing free trade agreements with its 
neighbors and top trade partners and today holds agreements with China, the United 
States, the EU, the European Free Trade Area, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Mercosur, 
Mexico, and Chile. Figure 7 below uses data from the World Bank Economic Indicators 
to show the significant increase in foreign trade (both in total imports and exports) that 
Peru experienced after the market reforms of the 1990s. The gray line marks the year 
1993 when Peru implemented its new constitution.  
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Figure 7: Peru’s Total Import/Export of Goods and Services Growth from 1973-2014. World Bank Data for the years 1980-1989 is 
not available. Data for those years was interpolated from available World Bank Data.  
By 2003, Peruvian exports had doubled from their 1993 numbers showing the 
start of a trend in increased trade through bilateral free trade agreements. From 2003 to 
the global economic crisis in 2008, both exports and imports grew by over 300%. Peru 
opened up dramatically as a market for international trade, and the combination of trade 
agreements and booming commodity prices in the 2000s led to spikes in total trade 
volume. The decrease in imports and exports since 2013 can be attributed to falling 
global commodity prices, Peru’s most valuable export. Chile and Colombia reflect the 
same trends as they too are dependent on commodity exports.  
In addition to bilateral trade agreements, Peru is also an active member of the 





























member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Because of its commitment to free trade and 
market liberalization, Peru has the lowest average tariff rate in the region at 1.0%. Even 
its highest rate of import duties only reaches 11% and applies to just 10.5% of goods, 
representing low trade costs with its trade partners (BMI Research, Peru Trade) 
 Despite poor growth rates of imports and exports in recent years, Peru remains an 
attractive partner due to its liberal market policies and wealth of natural resources. Should 
commodity prices rise in the future, Peru will attract even more trade, resolving the 
current slow growth in exports. 
LEGAL RISKS 
 In the Legal Risk Index, Peru ranks 25th out of 42 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries with a score of 46.5 out of 100 (BMI Research, Country Risk Index). Some 
concerns for foreign companies come from financial barriers to entry in the Peruvian 
market. Examples of this are high levels of income tax, especially in the mining sector, 
one of Peru’s most important areas for investment. This deters some firms from investing 
in Peru, especially after subdued growth in imports and exports for the past few years. 
However, improvements in the bureaucracy of founding, operating, and dissolving a 
business present some positives in the administrative environment. Administrative 
processes have been reorganized and simplified due to an online filing system (BMI 
Research, Peru Trade). This system, known as egovernance, is expected to increase the 
efficiency and transparency of the administrative process. Companies can now create a 
business, apply for permits, and approve documents online, making it easier to interact 
with government agencies and reducing the costs of incorporating in Peru. 
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 However, there are profound drawbacks to foreign investment in Peru due to its 
weak legal environment. Corruption is a ubiquitous influence on Peru’s legal system. In 
the 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index, Peru ranked 88 out of 138 countries included in 
the index with a score of 36 out of 100 (“Transparency International”). Peru’s highly 
corrupt law enforcement division, including both police and the judicial system, has 
weakened the rule of law and poses a severe risk for foreign companies attempting to 
resolve disputes through the Peruvian court system (BMI Research, Peru Trade). 
Contracts and property rights are not regularly enforced, and should a company refuse to 
bribe officials, they may be put at a disadvantage in court proceedings. However, foreign-
owned companies do have the option to have disputes resolved in international arbitration 
instead. Policies like this one come from the National Plan to Combat Corruption 
implemented in 2012. While this is a step in the right direction for the current 
government, lasting structural changes must be implemented before real reform of the 
legal system can be realized. 
 Another large deterrent for foreign firms is the absence of intellectual property 
rights protection. Peru has been on the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 watch list 
for Intellectual Property Rights since 1992. In a 2015 Report from the United States 
Trade Representative, the “Special 301 Report…is the result of an annual review of the 
state of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and enforcement in U.S. trading 
partners around the world” (Froman, 2015). As a country on the Special 301 watch list, 
foreign companies are right to be concerned about the protection of their intellectual 
property and patents. In R&D intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals, Peru presents 
a risky environment for FDI. 
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 These negative aspects of Peru’s legal environment are serious concerns for 
companies interested in FDI in Peru. The lack of protection for IPP and the corruption 
evident through Peru’s legal system are strong deterrents. However, for companies 
focused solely on exporting to Peru, some of these legal issues can be avoided.  
CULTURE 
 
Figure 8: Power Distance Index and Individualism v Collectivism Index scores for Chile and the United States 
 On the Power Distance Index, Peru scores similarly to Colombia and Chile 
with a score of 64 out of 100. In Peru, vertical, centralized organizational structures are 
common reflecting the difference in perception of superiors and subordinates (“Geert 
Hofstede”, 2016). Business relationships are influenced by rank, and decisions are made 
by the upper levels of management and communicated downwards. Some believe that 
Peru’s high power distance index can be related back to its history in the Inca Empire, a 
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tightly structured colonial rule, authoritarian governments, and the Catholic Church 
(“Geert Hofstede”, 2016). The United States received a score of 40 out of 100. It 
represents a business environment with a lower power index where offices are more 
collaborative than in most Latin American countries. Input from subordinates is 
encouraged because ideas are judged on their own merit, regardless of who proposed the 
idea. 
On the scale of Individualism v. Collectivism, Peru ranks similarly to Colombia 
with a score of 16 out of 100. It is a very collectivist society when in-groups provide 
security and protection in exchange for loyalty (“Geert Hofstede”, 2016). This can 
translate negatively into a business environment through nepotism and corruption. In a 
collectivist society, helping other members of an in-group through job opportunities, 
kickbacks, or business favors may be seen as acts of loyalty. This encourages corrupt 
practices, which in turn create a barrier for companies from more individualistic societies 
that are uncomfortable with such practices. In expanding practices to Peru, American 
companies will need to evaluate the business practices of potential partners to determine 
whether they violate the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. If they decide to enter into a 
business relationship, they must make an effort to build that relationship to successfully 
join the in-group. 
ANALYSIS 
Considering the economic, legal, and cultural environment of Colombia, Chile, 
and Peru, this report provides small and medium-sized businesses a general risk 
landscape for each country. However, businesses must still perform market research 
specific to their product or service in order to determine the feasibility of expanding their 
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business to these countries. The problems facing small and medium-sized businesses are 
different from those facing large corporations; therefore analysis must be done keeping 
those barriers in mind. 
According to the World Trade Organizaton, small and Medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) are defined as “companies with fewer than 250 employees” and which only 
conduct a small amount of business annually (determined separately by each country) 
(WTO). 40% of total economic activity in the U.S. is attributed to SMEs, and overall, 
SMEs contribute between 25% and 35% of global manufactured exports (“WTO and 
SMEs”). They represent a substantial portion of businesses, both in terms of sheer 
numbers and in economic impact, but also stand to experience the strongest barriers to 
internationalization for a variety of reasons: lack of capital, limited international 
experience, and low bargaining power. Some barriers that SMEs face include tariffs, lack 
of IPR protection, product standards, lack of support, and cultural and language 
differences (“WTO and SMEs”). 
 













Two main factors that small companies need to consider when evaluating 
possibilities for international expansion, in addition to specialized market research, are 
the ease of doing business in a country and risk mitigation. The openness of the business 
environment is an important consideration because most small companies do not have the 
resources that multinational corporations have at their disposal. They do not have access 
to the capital or expertise required to push their way into a market where business 
regulation is complex, costly, and time consuming. Risk mitigation is the second largest 
factor because the international strategy for small growing companies focuses on one 
country or market at a time with high pressure for return on investment. For example, 
companies need to avoid politically high risk environments where they may have to pull 
out operations, or worse, be forced out in times of political unrest. Larger companies 
have the resources to absorb a loss or fight back legally in the case of such an event. 
However, smaller firms lack the power to accommodate either of those strategies 
effectively. The following section will detail how small and medium-size enterprises can 
enter into foreign markets and which types of companies have the highest chance of 
successfully engaging in these markets while avoiding political, legal, and economic risk. 
COLOMBIA 
As shown in Figure 9, Colombia’s scores are the closest to the center of the radar 
graph, meaning that it has the most risky environment overall with operational risk as the 
variable that stands out. Taking into account the operational landscape for Colombia, 
legal risk is the most important consideration for companies that wish to successfully 
engage in the Colombian market. Corruption and the weakened rule of law make it 
difficult, if not impossible, for companies to enforce contracts or protect their property 
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rights. Therefore, it is advised for companies to partner with Colombian businesses in 
order to form strong relationships and to benefit from their knowledge of Colombian law. 
Relationships are the basis for business agreements in Colombia, where contracts are 
seen as guidelines or sometimes ignored, and it is more likely for companies to comply 
with their promises out of loyalty than through contract enforcement by the legal system. 
Businesses focused on FDI and building operations in Colombia, such as 
manufacturers, will face increased risks. Any potential manufacturing operations in rural 
areas of Colombia are risky due to the present conflict and FARC’s influence in the 
region. The threat of attack or conflict near manufacturing operations may be too great to 
justify investment in those regions. Should peace talks resolve successfully, the threat 
from these extreme groups will likely disappear and FDI will be a more viable option for 
companies manufacturing consumer goods, equipment, and other products in rural areas. 
However, the U.S. represents almost 30% of Colombia’s imports and is already a 
stable supplier of manufactured consumer goods. To avoid the increased risk of 
incorporating and operating within the country, and to accommodate the lack of capital of 
SMEs, exporting to Colombia is a steady and safer entry into the market. Colombia’s free 
trade agreement with the United States eliminated tariffs for 80% of consumer and 
industrial good imports, and tariffs on the last 20% will be phased out by 2022 ("U.S.-
Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement"). This provides a welcome environment for 
small firms looking to export goods to Colombia by breaking down a significant barrier 
to trade. However, as oil prices in Colombia fall, so may Colombia’s importing power. 
Therefore, companies exporting goods with stable demand, such as manufacturing and 
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construction equipment and parts, will fare better than those exporting consumer products 
with more reactive demand. 
Whether a firm is attempting to penetrate the market through exports or FDI, the 
firm will have to adapt to Colombia’s business culture. Forming and nurturing personal 
business relationships is critical to business success in Colombia. Businesses should 
prepare for long meetings with Colombian colleagues, especially initially, and should 
avoid rushing negotiations and price discussions. When negotiating contracts, U.S. 
businesses should also hire a lawyer with experience in Colombian contract law as 
problems in the legal system can result in international trade issues. These actions may 
seem small but can set a company up for success from the initial meeting. For 
information on expanding business services internationally, including both FDI and 
exporting, companies should visit ProColombia.com. Also available as a resource is the 
U.S Commercial Service in Colombia which provides resources for small enterprises to 
successfully evaluate and enter the Colombian market as well as identify potential 
business partners already established in the market. The resources provided by the U.S. 
Commercial service are invaluable for small firms that lack resources and international 
connections. 
CHILE 
As shown in Figure 9, Chile presents the least risky environment overall, 
outperforming Colombia and Peru in every category. In evaluating the viability of small 
business operations in Chile, economic openness is the most significant variable and what 
sets Chile apart from other Latin American countries. Chile is tied for 2nd out of 42 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries in terms of safety of trade and investment. Chile’s 
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economy is welcoming to both FDI and trade, especially with the United States, their 
second biggest trading partner behind China.  
For companies contemplating exporting to Chile, the free trade agreement with 
the U.S., enacted in 2004, made 100% of consumer and industrial goods exported to 
Chile duty free by January 2015. Since 2004, U.S. exports to Chile have increased over 
500%, showing the incredible market potential that Chile represents. SMEs that 
manufacture consumer and industrial goods are encouraged to take advantage of duty free 
exporting as it removes a significant barrier to entry for small firms. There is a large 
market for machinery and vehicle parts to support the national mining industry. However, 
Chile has a well-developed manufacturing environment, reducing the demand for 
consumer products, so firms must perform a thorough market analysis based on their 
particular products to determine the feasibility of entering the Chilean market.  
The Chilean government strongly encourages FDI and currently has the third 
highest FDI stock in the region at $215.5bn (BMI Research, Chile Trade). For firms 
looking to incorporate and build operations in Latin America, Chile is the most receptive 
country for FDI and offers many incentives. One of the many incentives run by the 
government is StartUp Chile. This program started in 2011 and offers grants to 
entrepreneurs, both native and foreign, trying to start a business in Chile which reduces 
the cost burden on small startup companies.  
The important factors that enable businesses to invest heavily in Chile are that 
intellectual property right law is strictly enforced, property rights are protected, and 
corruption is rare, making running a business in Chile less risky than in other countries. 
However, there are few select industries that are not viable for FDI. For example, the 
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government does restrict FDI in the sectors of national security, defense, and maritime 
transportation for national security reasons (BMI Research, Chile Trade). Other sectors 
where FDI is restricted include hydrocarbon exploration, uranium mining, and 
telecommunications. In these specific sectors, market entry is difficult for large firms and 
almost impossible for SMEs. Therefore Chile is not recommended as an FDI target for 
companies in these sectors. Because mining is one of the largest and most important 
industries in Chile, projects in that industry must be authorized by the Chilean Copper 
Commission and must pass rigorous environmental standards. These requirements can 
delay projects and deter small enterprises from vying for these project bids against larger 
corporations. Companies in mining and construction eager to enter the Chilean market 
are encouraged to partner with a Chilean company in order to obtain authorization to 
work in the industry. Although all companies are treated equally under Chilean law, these 
partnerships will provide experience and competitive advantages over other foreign 
companies. To find and select these partners, SMEs should reach out to the U.S. 
Commercial Service in Chile, a unit within the Department of Commerce that performs 
market research, organizes meetings with potential Chilean partner companies, and host 
trade shows for various industries throughout the country. This department is an 
invaluable resource for SMEs that want to expand into the Chilean market. 
PERU 
In the past few year Peru has experienced mild trade contraction and slowed 
economic growth, but shows strong growth in the long run. With few restrictions on trade 
and positive policies towards FDI, Peru is a desirable target for investment economically. 
It has the lowest average tariff rates in the region at 1.0%, and the highest tariff reaches 
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only 11%, very low barriers that make SMEs competitive alongside large corporations 
(BMI Research, Peru Trade). The main risks in operating in Peru are due to the weak 
legal system and the social environment. 
Peru’s commonplace corruption affects the effectiveness of the entire legal system 
and presents risk for foreign enterprises attempting to resolve disputes through the court 
system. Contracts are not frequently enforced through the Peruvian courts. The general 
sentiment is that if a business has to go to court to enforce a contract, it is already too 
late. Companies with many projects or with plans to contract out help – in other words 
companies that will rely heavily on contract enforcement – should not view Peru as their 
best option. If drawing up contracts is necessary, it is advised that companies hire legal 
counsel familiar with Peruvian law. Companies should specify exact terms of payment 
and performance, monitoring details of the contract closely. In Peru, contracts are viewed 
more as guidelines of the relationship, so specificity in drawing up contacts is necessary 
for small firms when discussing deliverables. Companies that are looking solely to export 
to Peru can bypass many of these legal issues, thereby mitigating their legal risk. 
Another risk to foreign direct investment in Peru is the absence of intellectual 
property rights protection. Peru has been on the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 
watch list for Intellectual Property Rights since 1992, posing a threat to companies in 
R&D intensive industries. SMEs in industries like pharmaceuticals and others that rely 
heavily on research and development are encouraged not to invest in Peru. Small firms 
may not have the resources to fight a legal battle over IPR, and without legal protection, 
these companies lose their competitive advantage in the market. Companies that attempt 
to invest in Peru must register any patents and trademarks with the INDECOPI (National 
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Agency for the Competition and Intellectual Property Protection) to receive legal 
acknowledgement and protection. 
Related to the legal process is the social environment in Peru and how it affects 
the operation of businesses within the country. There has been conflict between the 
public and the government over the operation of foreign businesses in rural areas of Peru, 
especially within the mining industry. For example, in 2011 a Canadian company was in 
the process of scouting a silver mine in Puno, but after violent protests from the public, 
the government withdrew the company’s mining rights, forcing them out of the area. 
Again in 2015, an Argentinian company, Pluspetrol, was forced to terminate exploration 
of gas deposits due to public conflict (BMI Research, Peru Trade). Very recently, in May 
of 2015, troops were sent to restore order in Arequipa when protests against a new copper 
mine turned violent. These examples show that mining, construction, or extraction 
companies should not invest in Peru in the current situation. The tension surrounding 
these types of projects puts the enterprise at risk, and could result in violence against the 
company. 
Companies focused solely on trade with Peru instead of foreign direct investment, 
such as manufacturers of consumer goods or mining and construction equipment, have a 
positive outlook because they avoid many of the risks associated with incorporating and 
operating in Peru. For these companies, the U.S. Commercial Service in Peru is an 
essential resource. Like other Commercial Service offices, the Commercial Service in 
Peru can meet personally with companies to evaluate market strategy, provide advanced 
market research, and inform companies of preferential trade practices, giving small firms 
the backing and encouragement of the U.S. government. 
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HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDY 
 In order to more clearly demonstrate strategies for SMEs in these focal markets, 
consider the case of the fictional company, Smith and Oliver (S&O) Manufacturing. S&O 
Manufacturing is a South Carolina manufacturer with 200 employees located in 
Greenwood, SC. Their main products are industrial machinery (HS Code: 84) which 
includes machinery and plant equipment for large-scale manufacturing plants. Examples 
of these are power plants or plants that produce construction and mining equipment. S&O 
Manufacturing’s expansion goals are to enter the Latin American market by forming a 
subsidiary to either manufacture goods in the target country or to distribute goods 
manufactured in the United States and exported to Latin America. 
In terms of exporting, the executives at S&O Manufacturing realized that 
industrial machinery products represent the largest import product group for Peru and 
Colombia and the second largest for Chile. That product group makes up 12.1% of 
Chilean imports, 15% of Peruvian exports, and 12.8% of Colombian imports (UN 
Comtrade). All three of these countries represent a demand market for these goods. One 
concern for exporting to these countries are falling global commodity prices as these 
countries are all highly dependent on commodity exports. If global prices continue to fall 
over the next few years, the purchasing power of these countries will decline. Therefore, 
companies attempting to export luxury or non-essential consumer goods would see a 
decline in sales abroad. However, firms exporting industrial machinery to support the 
manufacturing sectors in these countries will experience much more stable demand, so 
S&O Manufacturing will be able to continue exporting to Colombia, Chile, and Peru 
once they begin. They would also benefit from economies of scale from increased 
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production and greater production efficiency in their Greenwood, SC plant (Madura, 
420). 
S&O Manufacturing’s motives for FDI can be split into revenue related motives 
and cost related motives (Madura, 417-420). The revenue related motives include 
attracting new sources of demand through new markets and entering a profitable market 
where there is potential for high earnings. As for cost related motives, FDI would allow 
they to take advantage of foreign factors of production through low costs of labor and/or 
land.  
The next sections will detail proposed plans for S&O Manufacturing for 
Colombia, Chile, and Peru and conclude with a recommendation for the country that 
provides the most opportunity for success. 
S&O MANUFACTURING – COLOMBIA 
 Although there has been increased FDI in Colombia in recent years due to 
economic reforms and increase bureaucratic efficiency, Colombia is ranked 83rd 
worldwide in terms of corruption and suffers from a weak legal system that does little to 
enforce contracts or protect property rights. These factors combined together present 
significant risk to SMEs planning to build operations in Colombia. Another risk factor 
present with FDI is the conflict between the Colombian government and FARC. 
Manufacturing is normally established in rural areas to reduce land and operational costs, 
however, in Colombia, FARC still maintains some control in those regions, especially in 
the South and the East. As the feasibility of FDI is dependent on the outcome of political 
conflicts, it is not recommended that S&O Manufacturing build manufacturing plants or 
invest in Colombia until peace talks with FARC are resolved.  
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Therefore, exporting to Colombia would be the favorable, and less risky, strategy. 
S&O Manufacturing should manufacture their products in their Greenwood, SC plant and 
take advantage of reduced tariffs on 80-100% of industrial goods through the U.S.-
Colombian FTA to export those goods to Colombia. This strategy avoids operational risk 
in-country while still reducing costs, representing a safer entry into the market. Also, 
Greenwood is located just over three hours from the port of Charleston, a major 
international port that services Colombia. This shipping route is the most convenient, and 
therefore cheapest, of all the prospective countries. Another benefit is that Colombia is 
currently running a trade deficit with imports outweighing exports which bodes well for 
U.S. companies looking to export to Colombia. All of these factors support the business 
plan of exporting manufactured goods to Colombia as opposed to investing in 
subsidiaries in-country. As soon as peace talks are settled between the Colombian 
government and FARC, the threat will most likely disappear and FDI will become a more 
feasible option. However, exporting is the best option for S&O Manufacturing in the 
current political and business environment. 
S&O MANUFACTURING – CHILE 
 Chile represents the least risky environment of all three countries. It is the most 
receptive to FDI and companies, especially SMEs, can take advantage of the government 
incentives offered to foreign companies. Enforced intellectual property rights, protected 
property rights, and absence of corruption mitigate many of the risks associated with 
operating in Latin American countries, making it easier to conduct business there, 
especially for small firms with limited resources. The time to incorporate a business in 
Chile is 5.5 days, making it easy to enter the Chilean market quickly and start operations.  
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 As a manufacturer of industrial equipment, S&O Manufacturing’s should market 
its products to companies in Chile’s mining and construction sectors. In Chile, mining 
projects may be hard to come by as they must be approved by the Chilean Copper 
Commission. However, S&O Manufacturing simply produces the machinery to then be 
used by mining companies, meaning they would be indirectly involved in the mining 
sector and would need no such approval. As the mining industry is so important to 
Chile’s economic performance, there will always a need for industrial grade equipment to 
support that sector, providing steady, long-term demand for S&O products.  
 However, exporting to Chile is also an option for S&O Manufacturing. As of 
January 2015, 100% of U.S. consumer and industrial goods are duty free, allowing easy 
market entrance for small U.S. exporters like S&O Manufacturing. Chile’s well-
developed manufacturing environment reduces the demand for manufactured consumer 
products, but presents a large market for imported machinery and mechanical appliances 
to support the manufacturing and mining industries. By choosing to export to Chile, S&O 
Manufacturing avoids the upfront capital costs of incorporating and building operations 
in Chile while still obtaining access to the Chilean market. However, if S&O 
Manufacturing decides to focus on exportation, their potential clients would grow to 
include manufacturing plants in Chile as well as mining and construction companies, 
creating a larger consumer base.  
 To be successful in the Chilean market, S&O Manufacturing is recommended to 
either invest in building operations in Chile or to export as both represent low-risk, cost 
effective strategies. The decision depends on the company’s long-term goals for 
involvement in Latin America. A potential plan might be to export products to Chile as a 
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way to test the market reaction and reevaluate FDI once the company has established a 
steady consumer base in country. 
S&O MANUFACTURING – PERU 
 Peru is not currently the most attractive destination for U.S. FDI, not for any 
economic reasons, but due to concerns over legal risk. Corruption is prevalent in Peru, 
permeating the legal system and presenting risk for foreign companies operating in Peru. 
Its weak legal system and lack of contract enforceability create legal and operational risk 
for foreign firms attempting to resolve disputes through the legal system. If S&O 
Manufacturing were to build subsidiaries in Peru and suffer through these drawn out 
processes, it would significantly affect cash flows from the subsidiary to the parent 
company in South Carolina. The feasibility of a project is primarily measured through net 
present value and focuses on cash flow to the parent company. Any environment that can 
delay or halt those payments takes away from the feasibility of a business plan. 
Therefore, it is recommended that S&O Manufacturing mitigate legal risk by 
manufacturing in the United States and exporting to Peru. 
Peru, much like Colombia, is suffering from contracted buying power due to 
falling global commodity prices upon which their economies are dependent. However, as 
with Colombia, luxury and non-essential consumer goods are the products that suffer 
from the decline in imports. Industrial goods that support the manufacturing, 
construction, and mining sectors will maintain more stable demand and pull through the 
commodity pricing slump. 80% of these industrial and consumer goods are no longer 
subject to tariffs due to the U.S.–Peru free trade agreement, and the last 20% will be 
phased out by 2019. Although not all goods are phased out yet, it is important to 
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remember that Peru has the lowest average tariff rate in the region, making exporting an 
attractive strategy for U.S. firms. If S&O Manufacturing were to pursue exporting to 
Peru, they should take advantage of the lowered tariffs and market to mining companies 
and manufacturing plants in Peru. However, shipping to Peru would be more expensive 
than to Colombia due to its location on the Pacific Coast of South America. S&O would 
have to ship from Charleston, through the Panama Canal, to Peru, or ship cross-country 
by truck to California and then by boat to Peru. This would result in increased costs to 
deliver the goods to the target market.  
To be successful in the Peruvian market, S&O Manufacturing is not 
recommended to engage in FDI due to the prevalence of corruption and the absence of 
contract enforceability. The best strategy in terms of cost and risk mitigation is to 
manufacture their products in-house and export them to Peru. However, S&O 
Manufacturing should work with the U.S. Commercial service in Peru to create 
partnerships with Peruvian firms. These companies may take on some of the cost of 
shipment and therefore make this strategy more cost-effective for S&O Manufacturing. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Overall, considering operational and legal risk, cost, ease of doing business, and 
long-term sustainability, Chile would provide the most welcoming environment and 
opportunity for success for S&O Manufacturing. The country offers a business 
environment conducive to both exports and FDI along with a strong and transparent legal 
system to resolve any possible disputes. S&O Manufacturing would benefit from lack of 
tariffs and stable manufacturing and mining industries which provide demand for their 
products.  
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In order to form a detailed market entry strategy, S&O Manufacturing would have 
to analyze their products in order to narrow down their offerings and focus their 
marketing to a specific type of customer-mining companies, manufacturing plants, 
construction firms. They should then meet with both the South Carolina Small Business 
Development Center and the U.S. Export Assistance Center in South Carolina to take 
advantage of market analysis resources and specialized expertise in exporting to Chile.  
CONCLUSION 
 There is a common misconception that because many Latin American countries 
share a common language, that they are similar economically and culturally. Many large 
corporations, when entering the Latin American market, create a Latin American 
strategy, assuming that it will be applicable and effective in every country. This is a gross 
misstep. A marketing strategy that performs well in Brazil will not always produce results 
in Chile. A market entry plan built for Colombia will most certainly fail in Venezuela. 
Each country has its own economic, political, and cultural environment, requiring 
analysis of the legal system, administrative bureaucracy, trade policies, political stability, 
business culture, and much more in order to design a successful business plan.  
 The purpose of this report is to use Colombia, Chile, and Peru as examples of 
similarly sized Latin American countries, with similar economic and trade impact, that 
have vastly different business environments. Their unique histories and economic 
policies have created unique competitive industries within each country that makes them 
attractive. The cultural differences between countries also have a significant impact on 
conducting business successfully in each country. This report has outlined many of the 
risk environments, competitive sectors, and cultural norms in each country in order to 
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provide a basic understanding of the business environments for small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Small firms will use this as a resource for preliminary analysis of the 
Colombian, Chilean, and Peruvian markets, as well as a basis for their product-specific 
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EU – European Union 
FTA – Free Trade Agreement 
Identidad nacional – a feeling of belonging to a commonly shared cultural, social, and 
historical identity, usually accompanied with national pride. 
IPP – Intellectual property rights 
PDI – Power Distance Index 
SME – Small and medium-size enterprise 
Trade deficit – the amount by which the cost of a country's imports exceeds the value of 
its exports. 
TPP – Trans-Pacific Partnership 
WTO – World Trade Organization 
 
